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CHAPTE:R I 
INTRODUCTION 
The effects of monopoly have long been a concern of the economics 
profession and the law. The origins of this concern are contained in 
British connnon law and in the writings of Smith (42). Both British 
connnon law and Smith have tended to condenm. monopoly. 
Under British common law, agreements by sellers to fix prices have 
been illegal, at least since 1300. Price fixing is illegal because it 
tends to work "to the great impoverishment of the people'.'. In addition, 
restraints of trade were also generally illegal, depending on circum-
stances. Restraint of trade refers to the freedom of a producer to 
practice his trade. Although English law condenm.ed specific acts, the 
word monopoly was not contained in the law until 1602. At this time 
monopoly was used to describe the patents or public grants for exclusive 
manufacture granted by Queen Elizabeth. Eventually the law described 
monopoly as an exclusive grant (by the monar.chy) to do something which 
had been a conunon right, and the law further declared these monopolies 
to be illegal, except for special cases (31, pp. 98-99). 
Smith (42) also condemned monopoly. Smith's criticism of monopoly 
consists primarily of two points. First, monopoly prices are invariably 
higher than the "natural price'' (p. 47). The natural price is the one 
which results from free competition. The second point was that perpetual 
monopoly (that is, a public grant) excluded potential producers from 
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entering certain types of business. Both of these points were viewed 
as a tax on the citizens of a country (p. 593). Smith further argued 
that since the results of monopoly are different from the natural, 
i.e., freely competitive, situation society is hurt (p. 494). 
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Common law concerning monopoly and monopoly practice seemed to be 
focused on the redistribution of income which results from monopoly. The 
arguments of Smith also appear to be directed at the income distribution. 
In other words, Smith and the common law were concerned with the issue 
of equity. With the development of modern economic theory the concern, 
at least of the economics profession, shifted to an analysis of efficient 
resource allocation. 
Modern microeconomic theory can easily be used to demonstrate the 
results of monopoly as discussed by Smith. That is, monopoly (defined 
here as a single seller) does result in higher prices than would exist 
under more competitive conditions. But, since higher prices, by them-
selves, simply imply that a redistribution of income has occurred and 
since interpersonal comparisons of utility cannot be made, these higher 
prices do not indicate a cost to society. Instead modern theory examines 
the value of the final product being produced by a firm relative to the 
additional cost of the-last unit produced (i.e., marginal cost). If 
society places a higher value on the last unit of a product produced 
than the additional cost of producing that unit, then society would 
receive a net gain in satisfaction if additional units were produced. 
Under conditions of pure competition prices would tend to be equal 
to marginal cost. Since a monopolist (assuming the profit maximizing' 
motive) produces output at which price exceeds marginal cost, a misallo-
cation of resources results, which imposes costs on society in the form 
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of a lower level of economic welfare. In other words if resources could 
be reallocated from lower valued uses to the higher valued monopolized 
output society would receive a gain in satisfaction. Of course, since 
monopolies are assumed to be prof it maximizers the reallocation will not 
take place. 
It is generally accepted by the econ6mics profession that monopoly 
does result in a misallocation of resources, but it is not known with 
any certainty just how serious the costs of this misallocation are. 
Knowing the costs of monopoly is important both to the economic profes-
sion and to the application of public policy toward monopoly. In the 
United States there exists a body of state and federal antitrust laws 
concerned either with monopoly or monopolistic practices. Accurate 
information about the costs of monopoly would help insure that the 
application of these laws would result in net benefits to society. 
Antitrust violations are among the most costly cases tried, often 
costing several millions of dollars. If the costs of enforcing the 
antitrust laws exceed the benefits, then these laws do not increase the 
welfare of society. At the same time, if the benefits of reducing 
monopoly are greater than the costs, more resources should be devoted 
to reducing monopoly. Either way efficient public policy cannot be 
made without some knowledge of the costs of monopoly. 
Several researchers have attempted to measure the costs of misallo-
1 
cation of resources due to monopoly in the United States. The first 
study of this type was undertaken by Harberger (15) in 1954. Harberger 
did not find the cost of monopoly to be significant relative to national 
1 A brief sununary of some of these studies is presented in Chapter 
III. 
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income. Except for a later study in 1964 by Kamerschen (25), other 
researchers have also found these costs to be small relative to national 
income. 
There have been many criticisms to these studies consisting of 
theoretical problems and difficulties in data collection. 2 In addition 
past studies have examined only manufacturing and mining. Financial and 
service industries have not been analyzed, nor, except for Posner (36), 
has there been an analysis of monopoly due to government regulation other 
than general theoretical discussions. 
Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this study is to examine some of the costs of 
monopoly which are a result of government regulation. The specific 
industry to be examined is commercial banking. The analysis is concerned 
with monopoly power in commercial banking, but since this power is due 
to government regulation which restricts entry, what is actually being 
examined is the cost of.regulation in commercial banking. Thus there 
are two purposes of this study: to examine the effects of monopoly in 
the financial sector of the U.S. economy and to measure some of the 
costs of government regulation are studied. 
The scope of this study is more limited than many of the past 
monopoly studies. Rather than attempting to measure the costs of 
regulation for the entire economy, a few specific types of output are 
examined. This limited objective consists of examining the lending 
activity of commercial banks and is preferable for two major reasons. 
2see Chapter III. 
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Past studies have combined many distinct products into one by looking 
at, for example, the profit rates and costs of entire sectors of the 
economy, e.g., manufacturing and mining. This procedure hides monopoly 
power by combining monopolized products with competitive ones. Clearly 
this results in reducing the estimated effects of monopoly power. By 
examining different loans made by commercial banks the problem of hidden 
monopoly power is greatly reduced. Secondly, although the results 
cannot be used to make broad conclusions about the monopoly problem in 
the United States, the application of public policy (i.e., antitrust or 
regulation) is made on an industry-by-industry basis which requires 
data on individual industries. 
Organization of the Study 
Chapter II of this study presents the basic theoretical {malysis 
used in past research to examine.the costs on monopoly. The initial 
discussion presents the concept of deadweight welfare loss which is a 
part of the costs of regulation examined. The bulk of Chapter II 
extends the theoretical analysis ta include situations in which govern-
ment regulation creates monopoly positions. The theoretical discussion 
presents an argument that the income transfer to monopolists, which has 
in the past been ignored, results in additional costs to society when 
regulation creates monopoly. Basically this additional cost is due to 
competition for monopoly positions in a market. Therefore the costs of 
monopoly become, in fact, costs of regulation and exceed the deadweight 
welfare loss. The model presented in this chapter is the basis for the 
empirical model of Chapter V. In addition to the theory the chapter also 
described some of the theoretical and practical problems associated with 
the model which is developed. 
6 
Empirical evidence on the costs of monopoly are sununarized in 
Chapter III. Past efforts have looked only at the deadweight welfare 
loss, therefore only deadweight loss studies Are discussed. Certain 
aspects of two studies are presented in some detail since they form the 
basis for the empirical model. Also, in this chapter, the theoretical 
and empirical problems associated with past research are discussed. 
Chapter IV expands the.theoretical model of Chapter II to. incorporate 
commercial banking. The model in Chapter II is basically applied to a 
single product firm. Since several different loans will be output, the 
model must be applied to a multiproduct firm. The first part of Chapter 
IV develops a model of the multiproduct firm, including a brief discussion 
of joint and common costs. The simple multiproduct firm model is then 
applied to commercial banking incorporating aspects of lending activity 
which differ from the simple model developed in the first part of the 
chapter. The result is a multiproduct model which is applicable to 
commercial banking and allows identification of the costs of entry 
restriction in commercial banking. 
The empirical model is presented in Chapter V. This model, based 
on the theoretical model of Chapter IV, basically consists of· two 
multiple regressions. One regression equation is used to obtain the 
various demand related variables required by the approaches discussed in 
Chapter III. The second regression is us~d to obtain the necessary cost 
variables. The data used consist of information on the Tenth Federal 
Reserve District. Also in the chapter is a discussion of some modifica-
tions which had to be made because of data problems. 
Chapter VI presents the results of the study. The costs of 
regulation are given both for individual loans and for total lending 
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activity by banks in the Tenth District. Finally, Chapter VII interprets 
the importance of the results for public policy which restricts entry 
into connnercial banking and proposes additional refinements which 
could be made (with better data) and additional areas for future study. 
CHAPTER II 
COSTS OF REGULATION 
In most modern economies, many industries have some regulation or 
regulations imposed on them by governmental agencies. These regulations 
are imposed on producers because of some perceived benefits accruing to 
society. There are many different types of regulation ranging from 
restrictions on entry into various types of production to specific 
regulations on methods of production, pricing, and regulations on levels 
of output. Even though there may be benefits from regulation, there are 
also certain costs associated with governmental regulation. The 
following discussion will present a theoretical examination of some of 
these costs when regulation restricts entry into a particular industry. 
Although the other types of regulation are not unimportant, this study 
will not be concerned with their costs. 
Consumers' and Producers' Surplus 
Traditional analysis of the effects of monopoly have centered on 
an examination of consumers' and producers' surplus. Therefore, a 
brief discussion of these concepts is necessary. 
The concept of consumers' surplus was originated by Dupuit (18) in 
1844 and was defined as the area under the demand curve above the market 
price. Marshall in effect used the same definition of consumers' surplus, 
but qualified it with the assumption of a constant marginal utility of 
8 
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money income. Although there has been a voluminous amount of material 
written concerning this concept, including at least 27 methods of 
measurement (25), this study adopts the definition of Marshall and 
Dupuit. Using the definition that consumers' surplus is the difference 
between what consumers would be willing to pay for some quantity of a 
product and what they actually pay, the triangle hfp is consumers' 
surplus, in Figure 1. 
Supply 
Demand 
0 q 
Quantity/Unit of Time 
Figure 1. Consumers' and Producers' Surplus 
In markets characterized by free entry there is also a benefit 
analogous to consumers' surplus which accrues to sellers--producers' 
surplus. Producers' surplus can be represented by the difference 
between what sellers receive for some quantity sold and what they would 
have been willing to accept. This producers' surplus is represented in 
Figure 1 by the triangle pfj. 
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If there is enforced on the market a price which is higher than the 
competitive price (that is, higher than marginal cost), there is a loss 
in welfare for society due to a loss of consumers' surplus. Figure 2 
shows supply and demand for good Q and competitive price, P , and output, 
c 
Q • If a higher than competitive price, P , exists, due, for example·, 
c m 
to governmental controls, the sum of the consumers' surplus and producers' 
surplus areas is reduced. At the price P there is a loss of consumers' 
m 
surplus equal to the area of P P CD. At the same time there is a loss cm 
of producers' surplus of ABD, but a gain of P P CB. The area P P CB is cm cm 
a part of the loss of consumers' surplus; however, since it is a 
transfer from buyers to producers, it does not represent a loss in 
society's economic welfare. The total social loss of welfare, called 
deadweight loss, is the area BCD plus ABD. Methods for measuring this 
deadweight loss were developed by Hotelling (20) for examining any price 
which exceeds marginal cost. Most analysis has assumed constant costs 
which eliminates the concept of producers' surplus. This assumption is 
also made in this paper and all additional discussion will exclude 
producers' surplus. 
There are two additional assumptions in this analysis which are 
important. First, it is assumed that there are no external costs of 
benefits associated with production or consumption. If externalities 
do exist, efficient resource allocation does not result from equating 
price and marginal cost. Second, it is assumed that there are no 
problems of second best. If second best problems exist, it is not 
certain that a social cost exists from price exceeding marginal cost; 
in such an instance, if price were reduced until it equalled marginal 
cost it would not be certain that resources would be more efficiently 
allocated. 
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Figure 2. Welfare Loss 
Costs of Monopoly Creation 
As shown in the preceding discussion, there is a deadweight loss of 
consumers' surplus which results from any price which exceeds the 
marginal cost of production (again assuming no externalities and no 
problems of second best). Since the profit maximizing motive is assumed 
to explain output behavior of the perfectly competitive firm, the short 
run supply curve is the sum of the marginal cost curves of the firms in 
a perfectly competitive industry; and, therefore, there will not be any 
deadweight consumers' surplus loss either in the short run or in the 
long run (assuming perfectly competitive factor markets). However, even 
in a perfectly competitive industry there may be, in the short run, a 
transfer from buyers to sellers because of an increase in demand or an 
improvement in technology, assuming constant resource prices. This 
transfer in perfect competition does not result in a net loss to society 
since it is only a transfer. But, the transfer does result in an 
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eventual benefit to society. The transfer is also a loss of consumers' 
surplus which represents payments by buyers which exceed the opportunity 
cost of producing. This transfer is, of course, simply an economic 
profit which will be eliminated as new plants are placed into production, 
increasing supply, and therefore driving price down until all economic 
profits are eliminated. With constant resource prices, socie~y then 
would be paying the same price per unit but consuming a larger quantity. 
Compet.ition for the transfer, then, results in additional resources 
being used to produce the product, thereby increasing output and 
eliminating the transfer. 
Suppose that instead of a perfectly competitive industry, a parti~ 
cular industry has characteristics which are not consistent with a 
perfectly competitive industry. If an industry is characterized by 
natural monopoly, or at least substantial economies of scale, some firms 
are forced out of the industry. As firms leave the industry, at some 
point the remaining firms will each face a downward sloping demand or 
average revenue relationship. Once this occurs marginal cost and price 
will not be equal. The situation, of course, is one in which price 
exceeds marginal cost. 
The situation resulting from an economies of scale entry barrier 
is likely to be one in which there is a deadweight welfare loss and a 
transfer from buyers to sellers. But if prices are held at the expected 
average cost of new entrants, new entry will not occur. This limit 
pricing coupled with the presence of substantial economies of scale will 
not allow a new firm to achieve the necessary output levels required to 
be competitive with existing firms unless there is an increase in demand 
for the product being produced. 
To summarize these results, under market conditions involving 
substantial economies of scale, there is a net reduction in aggregate 
welfare which is equal to the deadweight loss of consumers' surplus. 
There is also a transfer of income from buyers to sellers which will 
not be eliminated by competition; this transfer does not represent a 
net loss to society. 
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Do the above conclusions concerning perfect competition and 
situations of scale economy entry barriers also apply when entry into 
an industry is restricted by regulations imposed by a government? The 
following discussion will attempt to show that when entry is restricted 
by governmental activity the transfer will result in a net loss to 
society in addition to the deadweight consumers' surplus loss. This 
additional loss is due to competition for the transfer. 
Various economists have discussed the effects of a transfer which 
is the result of government entry restrictions or other regulations. 
It will be useful for the purposes of this study to summarize the 
discussion of several of these individuals. 
One of the first artd more general discussions is that of Tullock 
(45). Tullock begins his analysis with a standard tariff model (using 
supply and demand), and points out that the income transfer, which 
traditionally has been ignored, results in resource use beyond that 
which is required to produce the product on which the tariff is levied. 
If the subject is looked at in a dynamic sense, it is clear that tariffs 
are imposed after domestic producers have exerted influence on govern-
mental policy makers. Domestic producers would not be expected to 
undertake this type of activity unless some gain were expected, that is, 
producers would be expected to use resources up to the point that the 
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expected "marginal return on the last dollar spent was equal to its 
likely return producing the transfer". At the same time others may be 
using resources in an attempt to stop the imposition of the tariff. 
Both of these expenditures are wasted from society's viewpoint since 
their function is to achieve or prevent an income transfer {p. 228). 
A similar analysis was provided by Krueger (27) also in reference 
to international trade. Krueger's discussion used the concept of rent 
rather than income transfers. Rent is defined as the "surplus of 
earnings over what can be earned in the best alternative" (44, p •. 106). 
Except for this difference in terminology, Krueger's (27, pp. 291-293) 
analysis differed little from that of Tullock's, except for some 
specific examples of the form that rent competition would take under 
different types of quota restrictions. In addition, while Tullock did 
not attempt to measure the value of the transfer or rent, Krueger 
provides estimates of the size of rents for India and Turkey (p. 294). 
As implied by Tullock (45), Krueger (27, p. 301) also argues that the 
value of rents measures the costs of resources used in rent seeking. 
A study by Douglas and Miller (9) directly examined rent competition 
in a regulated industry. Their study differs from Krueger and Tullock 
by emphasizing competition by firms within an industry for existing 
rents. The combination of restricted entry and price regulation 
resulted in the creation of rents in the airlines industry. The most 
important form of competition for these rents is more frequent departures 
and arrivals. This type of competition increases costs to firms in the 
industry, thereby tending to eliminate any rents. 
If the potential rents under airline regulation are entirely elimi-
nated, and there is evidence that in airlines this is the case (8, p. 662), 
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then are the resources used in .competing and eliminating the rent 
wasted? There is no clear-cut answer to this question. To the degree 
that the resulting price and scheduling combinations differ from the 
free market solution, then there is a social cost. At the same time, 
to the degree that rent competition more closely approximates the free 
market solution, there is a social benefit not a cost. This is the 
basic difference between the analysis of Douglas and Miller (9) and 
that of Krueger (27) or Tullock (45). Rent competition results in a 
social cost according to Krueger and Tullock, but in some cases that 
competition may result in some benefits to society. 
The theoretical arguments and empirical evidence do support the 
existence of competition for the monopoly transfer or rent which results 
from government restrictions. Firms can be expected to use resources to 
obtain the transfer as long as the marginal expenditure is less than 
the marginal return. The airlines industry provides a good example in 
which the actual value of resources used in competing are directly 
measurable. In many industries it is not possible to measure these 
costs directly, hence Krueger and Tullock both use the size of the 
transfer as a proxy for these costs. 
Posner (36) has developed a model of the social costs of monopoly. 
The present study's method of measurement is based on Posner's paper, 
and, therefore, his theoretical argument and method of measurement are 
discussed in some detail. 
Posner initially discussed the effects of the creation of a transfer 
and a deadweightwelfare loss due to price exceeding marginal cost. The 
simple model he presented is identical (except for a constant marginal 
and average cost) to that which was presented in this study and also 
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discussed by Tullock (45), including the resulting competition for the 
transfer. His estimate of the social costs of monopoly consists of the 
sum of the transfer (as a proxy for resource use in competing for the 
transfer) and the deadweight welfare loss. The main conh·ibution of his 
paper, other than the model, is a discussion of the assumptions or 
conditions which are critical if the transfer is to result in a social 
cost (36, pp. 809-810). 
Posner's first critical assumption is that obtaining a monopoly is 
a competitive activity (pp. 809-810). This assumption is a basic 
assumption of economic theory; in other words, there is competition for 
any scarce resource .. Not only is this an assumption of theory, but it 
is also easily observable that individuals compete for scarce resources 
whether those resources are land, raw materials, labor, or capital. 
In this case the scarce resource is a monopoly position. Competition 
for a monopoly position can be seen in several instances. In addition 
to those discussed by Tullock (45), Krueger (27), and Douglas and 
Miller (9), individuals expend resources to obtain patents, television 
licenses or attempt to form cartels (36, p. 809). There does not 
appear to be any reason to assume that competition does not occur for 
monopoly positions, and many examples of this type of competitive 
activity do exist. 
His second assumption is that the long run supply of inputs used 
in obtaining a monopoly is perfectly elastic and therefore does not 
contain any rents (pp. 809-811). The importance of this assumption is 
that if rents do exist, then at least some of the costs of monopolizing 
are also simply income transfers. In other words, that part of the 
value of resources used to compete for the monopoly position which is 
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a rent going to resource owners does not represent additional resource 
use. over the long run this assumption is not necessary. If rents for 
monopolizing resources do exist, individuals would be expected to compete 
for those rents, so that once those rents are bid away the resources 
used are wasted (pp. 810-811). 
His last assumption, which is a critical one, is that no socially 
valuable by-products (for example, higher quality service) result from 
rent competition (pp. 810-811). Posner simply ignored this possibility 
but admitted it could occur and referred to the rent competition in the 
airlines industry. Except for the Douglas and Miller (9) paper, there 
is no evidence concerning the useful by-products which may result. 
However, there is an important difference between competing for a 
monopoly position and competing within an industry for existing rents. 
Posner in his paper confused these two distinct situations. 
Suppose that the number of firms in an industry is largely fixed 
by government restrictions, as in airlines, and that rents do exist. In 
this case firms will compete among themselves for these rents. As 
indicated by Douglas and Miller (9, p. 667) this competition may move 
the industry towards the market solution of a more competitive industry 
and therefore may not be socially wasteful. Any analysis which estimates 
existing industry costs will include the cost of these useful by-products, 
since the cost of this competition is included in the costs of the firms. 
Of course, this results in possible overestimation of the value of any 
by-products. In any case, socially valuable products or services 
resulting from competition are not necessarily ignored in an empirical 
study. 
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In contrast to competition within an industry, competing for a 
monopoly position will not result in socially valuable products or 
services. This case involves potential firms and the resources used 
are to obtain the right to produce. The value of these r~sources (for 
example, legal fees, consultants, studies, travel expenses, and 
lobbyists) will not be included in the operating firms' costs and are 
not related to the activity of production itself; hence, they are 
wasted. Even if certain services were proposed by a potential firm 
(services not presently offered by the industry), until they are 
produced no benefits result; and when they are produced, their cost 
would be included in the firm's costs. 
As listed above, the three assumptions of Posner (36) appear to be 
reasonable. To summarize, the first assumption is nothing more than an 
extension of both theory and emperical research concerning the competi-
tion for any scarce resource. The second assumption involves assuming 
the markets for inputs into the monopolizing activity are in a long run 
equilibrium in which any rents have been eliminated. While at any 
point in time these rents accruing to resources may exist, the size of 
the rents represents the value of resources which will be wasted in 
bidding for the rents; therefore, including the value of these rents 
is justified. The final assumption is valid because potential new firms 
obviously cannot create useful by-products (except for information flows) 
since they are not yet producing. At the same time, socially useful 
products which result from competition by existing firms are not 
necessarily ignored since the costs of these products are included in 
firms' costs. 
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There are two additional assumptions which Posner does not 
explicitly discuss. The first is that potential monopolists have perfect 
knowledge concerning the size of the rents to be earned. This assumption 
is not necessary from the viewpoint of potential firms, since their 
behavior is based on the expected return of the monopoly right. However, 
if the size of the transfer is to be used as a proxy for resource use, 
the perfect knowledge assumption is necessary. It must also be assumed 
that resource markets, particularly those for inputs into monopolizing, 
work efficiently. If there are serious immobilities in resource 
markets, then some of the existing rent may not represent resource use. 
Of course, the longer the time period analyzed, the more likely it is 
that these two assumptions will in fact be accurate, since in the long 
run resources will tend to move into monopolizing activities and 
potential firms would have additional time in which to adjust their 
estimates of potential profits and, therefore, resource use. 
The costs examined by Posner (36) are shown in Figure 3. In this 
diagram P and P are the monopoly and competitive prices, respectively; 
m c 
~ and Qc are monopoly and competitive outputs. The total social cost 
of regulation is the sum of the deadweight welfare loss and what this 
study will call the transfer cost (i.e., the transfer of consumers' 
surplus which represents resources used to obtain the monopoly rents). 
The deadweight loss is the triangle W and the transfer cost is the 
rectangle T. The deadweight loss can be calculated using: 
1 W • 2 (f:iP) (f:iQ). (1) 
In equation 1, ~p is the absolute value of the difference between the 
monopoly\ and competitive prices (i.e., P ':"' P ) and f:iQ is the absolute 
m c . 
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value of the difference between the monopoly and competitive outputs 
(i.e.,~ - Qc). The transfer cost is calculated using: 
T = llP(Q - llQ). 
c 
(2) 
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Figure 3. Deadweight Loss and Transfer Cost 
Posner derives two relationships relating the deadweight loss and the 
transfer cost, depending on available data. 
The first case is relevant when the deadweight loss, price elasticity 
of demand, and monopoly price increase are available and the price 
elasticity is assumed constant, i.e., non:..linear demand. The second 
case is useful when the monopoly price increase, the monopoly output, 
and the price elasticity of demand at the monopoly price is known, and 
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the demand curve is assumed to be linear (36, pp. 813-815). The nature 
of this study requires the use of the second case, so the derivation of 
the relationship for non-linear demand is not given. 
For case two, begin with the inverse of the slope of the demand 
curve: 
(3) 
In equation 3, l:.Q, ~P, ~ and Pm are the same as defined earlier, and 
E is the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand at the monopoly 
price. This equationccan be used to obtain an expression for l:.Q. Using 
the ratio of equation 1 to equation 2, the relationship between the 
deadweight loss and the transfer cost can be derived as follows: 
W/T = 1/2 (L:.P}(l:.Q) I (l:.P)~. 
From equation 3, ~Q = (l:.P/Pm)(E)(~); substituting this expression for 
~Q into W/T: 
W/T = 1/2 (~P/P )E 
m 
p - p 
W/T = 1/2 ( m c)E p 
m 
p 
c W/T = (E - ~ E)/2 p 
m 
W/T m E(l - (P /P ))/2. 
c m 
Letting P /P a k, 
c m 
W/T = E(l - k)/2. (34, p. 815) 
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(4) 
If either W or T can be calculated, then the other can be obtained 
using equation 4. The deadweight.loss can be calculated using equation 1 
if the change in price and quantity due to a monopoly position are known. 
Alternatively, if the change in price and the monopoly output are known 
the transfer cost can be obtained using equation 2. Once either W or T 
are estimated, then if the price elasticity of demand (E) and the 
competitive-monopoly price ratio (Pc/Pm= k) are.known then equation 4 
can be used to estimate the remaining cost. The sum of T and W then 
would be the total social cost of monopoly. 
Posner's use of the deadweight loss triangle as a cost of monopoly 
is largely accepted both in economic theory and in empirical research on 
the subject. 1 However, the use of the transfer as a proxy of resource 
use involves both theoretical and empirical difficulties. These diffi-
culties limit the usefulness of the transfer but do not negate its use. 
Therefore, these problems a.re discussed below. 
The analysis of Posner has been criticized by Siegfried (40) on 
several points. Siegfried does not believe .that the profits triangle 
provides a useful guide to the social costs of rent competition. These 
monopoly profits, as discussed by Tullock (45), and by Siegfried (40), 
result in wasted resources (1) used by potential entrants to attain the 
profits, (2) used ·by established firms to protect profits, and (3) used 
by consumers to eliminate the monopoly power. 
1The results of research on the deadweight loss are sununarized in 
Chapter III. 
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Siegfried (40, p. 692) stated that the transfer rectangle of 
Posner's is relevant only to established monopolists, since it is what 
would be lost by those firms if they lose their monopoly positions. 
Although potential monopolists and consumers would be willing to spend 
up to their post-entry gain, Siegfried argued that the rectangle does 
not accurat~ly measure the value of the resources used in these efforts. 
He then suggested two reasons why the profit rectangle is even a 
deficient measure of actions by established firms to protect their 
positions. The value of any resources used.to protect a monopoly 
position would be included in the firm's cost curves and so would not 
be included in the profit rectangle. In addition, established firms 
would only spend enough resources to protect their position, which may 
be less than the area of the rectangle. The total value of resources 
used would depend on expectations about the efforts of potential 
entrants. These considerations involve decision making under uncertainty 
and risk by both existing firms and by potential entrants. Because of 
this dymanic nature, Siegfried (40, p. 693) concluded that the use of 
the transfer rectangle is "very" rough. 
Siegfried seems to be correct in this view, for example, in the 
case of potential entrants, the transfer rectangle is actually an 
underestimate of actual resource use. As was discussed by Tullock 
(45, p. 232), an estimate of the rectangle does not include the value 
of resources used by potential entrants who failed in their attempts. 
The points made by Siegfried concerning the expenditures by 
established firms appear completely valid, making the profit rectangle 
a poor measure of resource use by these firms. The fact that these 
costs are included in the firm's cost curves would also result in an 
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underestimate of resource use by potential entrants if potential firms 
do not use industry profits as the entire expected gain. That is, if 
potential firms estimate the potential transfer exclusive of the cost 
of protecting their monopoly, then an estimate of existing profits 
would underestimate resources used to become a monopoly. 
As noted above, the profit rectangle may actually underestimate 
the social cost from potential entrants depending on the estimating 
techniques of potential firms. Thus, the profit rectangle is only a 
rough guide to actual wasted resources because it does not adequately 
take into account resources used by potential entrants who fail, 
established firms protecting their position, or expenditures by consumer 
groups to eliminate the monopoly position. Therefore, since estimation 
of the profit rectangle would tend to ignore existing firms' expenditures, 
consumer expendtirues and entry attempts which fail, at worst the 
rectangle is a low estimate of actual resource use. 
There is one final difficulty with the use of the profit rectangle 
which is not discussed by Siegfried (38)~ although it is mentioned in a 
footnote by Posner (36, p. 809). The difficulty is, in this rather 
simple analysis, that there is an implicit assumption that the monopoly 
profits exist for only one period. Within this model, firms are actually 
competing for a one period transfer. More realistically the competition 
for a monopoly position by potential entrants could be looked at as an 
attempt to capture a flow of net revenue over time, and any single 
period estimate would therefore underestimate actual resources used. 
This means that the estimated transfer for a single period may represent 
the value of only a part of the resources used to achieve the monopoly 
position. Clearly there is a problem in placing a single ~alue on the 
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cost of the monopolizing resources. A potential monopolist would use 
resources up to the present value of the expected net revenue flow. 
Calculating this present value would present several difficulties. 
First, and perhaps easiest to handle, is determining a valid discount 
rate. Second, there is the risk that any new firm may fail. Finally, 
a firm must have some estimate of the length of time in which the market 
power of its position will not be diminished. This time period would 
be determined by the possibility of additional entry, particularly if 
there is increasing demand, and, in the case of regulated entry, the 
possibility of governmental policy changes allowing easier entry. Even 
though this single period problem would result in a transfer estimate 
which is not accurate, it is not likely to result in an overestimate. 
Therefore if a study, such as this one, uses a pne period estimate it 
can only be used as.an indicator of the size of potential profit and 
the monopolizing effort; but it would be a low estimate. 
Summary 
The chapter has presented an argument that if a monopoly position 
exists, there will be a welfare loss to society equal to the deadweight 
loss of consumers' surplus. This loss of consumer surplus exists 
regardless of the source of the monopoly power. If a monopoly position 
exists because of barriers not related to economies of scale, then there 
will be additional costs of monopoly due to potential firms attempting 
to enter the industry, existing firms protecting their position, and by 
consumers attemtping to eliminate the monopoly positions. Although 
there are difficulties in using the transfer from buyers to the 
monopolists as a measure of resources used to achieve a monopoly, the 
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transfer most likely would provide a· low estimate for four reasons: 
(1) the transfer does not accurately represent efforts of existing 
firms; (2) the transfer does not accurately represent efforts by 
consumers; (3) potential entrants who fail in their attempt are ignored, 
and; (4) this method of measurement is for a single period model and 
does not reflect the fact that it is a flow of net revenue that potential 
firms would be attempting to obtain. 
There are, then, two sources of the social costs due to a monopoly; 
in the past only one of these has been investigated by most researchers. 
Usually only the deadweight welfare loss has been examined by those 
concerned with the monopoly question. The next chapter summarizes the 
results of these efforts. 
CHAPTER III 
COST OF MONOPOLY: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
As discussed.in the preceding chapter, monopoly, particularly if it 
is due to government entry restrictions, results in a social cost in the 
form of a deadweight loss of consumers' surplus and from resources 
wasted in efforts to obtain the revenue transfer from buyers to a 
monopolist by achieving a monopoly right. In the past there have been 
several attempts to measure the deadweight loss due to monopoly power. 
It is useful to review some of these studies in order to see how this 
technique has been employed, to examine the different methods used, and 
to examine the problems with measuring the deadweight ·loss. The 
transfer has generally been ignored since it was considered to affect 
equity but not the efficient allocation of resources. 
Welfare Loss Studies 
The first attempt to measure welfare loss due to monopoly was a 
study by Harberger (15) in 1954. He used a sample of 73 industries from 
1924 to 1928. This particular time period was chosen because of a 
relatively stable economic structure with no violent demand shifts and 
because accounting values of capital were close to actual values. 
Another reason for the use of this time period was an existing study 
which provided profit estimates for the 73 industries (p. 79). In order 
to obtain a normal rate of return Harberger calculated an average rate of 
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return for each industry over the five-year period. A price elasticity 
of demand of unity was assumed by Harberger. 
Based on the profit estimates and on the assumed unit elasticity, 
Harberger (15, p. 82) estimated the cost.of monopoly (i.e., the dead-
weight loss) at 59 million dollars, or less than one-tenth of 1 percent 
of national income. In 1954 prices, this loss amounted to $1. 50 per 
capita. Harberger stressed that in h\l..s attempt to estimate this loss, 
efforts were made. to overstate its size. 
Harberger's study was criticized by Stigler (43) on two bask 
points. Stigler argued that firms with monopoly would not operate 
where marginal revenue was zero, that is, where price elasticity of 
demand is one. He also questioned the accuracy of the profit data used 
by Harberger. Because of these two points, the welfare loss estimate 
by Harberger was too low. 
In response to these criticisms of Stigler, Schwartzman (38) 
attempted to measure the welfare loss for 1954 using Harberger's model 
but with better profit data and with different price elasticities. 
Using his profit data, and price elasticity of one and two, he also 
found the welfare loss to be less than one-tenth of 1 percent of national 
income. 
These low estimates of the welfare loss due to monopoly were, to 
many economists, surprising. Another attempt to measure this loss was 
made by Kamerschen (24), using data for 1956-57 to 1960-61. He argued 
that more recent data and better statistical techniques would provide 
a better estimate of the loss. In addition, Kamerschen attempted to 
estimate the price elasticities of demand rather than assuming them. 
Before looking at Kamerschen's findings, it is useful.to·exa.mine his 
method of estimating the price elasticities, since his method is used 
in the present study. 
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The method for estimating the price elasticity of demand begins 
from the basic price theory relationship between marginal revenue and 
price: 
In this equatiort MR is marginal revenue, P is price and Ed is the 
absolute value of the price elasticity of demand. By solving the above 
equation for Ed the following is obtained: 
Ed = PI (P - MR) • 
Assuming industry profit maximization, i.e., MR= MC, where MC is 
marginal cost, the equation becomes: 
Ed= P/(P - MC). (5) 
Therefore, if firm and industry profit maximization is assumed and if 
an estimate for price and marginal cost can be obtained, the price 
elasticity of demand can be estimated using equation 5. 
Kamerschen (24), using unit elasticity, found the loss estimate to 
be 1.9 percent of national income which is substantially larger than 
Harberger (15) or Schwartzman (38) obtained. Using his elasticity 
estimates the welfare loss was 5.4 to 6.2 percent of national income. 
Kamerschen (24) concluded from his study that the welfare effects of 
monopoly are significant. 
A somewhat different approach was attempted by Bell (2) in 1973. 
Using concentration ratios as an indicator of monopoly power, he found 
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that the more monopolized an industry is the higher prof it rates and 
wage rates. He assumed that monopolies share their gains with workers 
and, therefore, some of the welfare loss is hidden in higher wages. 
Assuming a price elasticity of demand of 1.5, Bell found the welfare 
loss due to monopoly profits to be .0394 percent of total manufacturing 
revenue. The additional loss due to higher wages was .604 percent of 
total manufacturing revenue. With a loss estimate of about 1 percent of 
total manufacturing revenue, then the loss is less than 1 percent of 
national income. 
In 1973, using Fortune 500 data.for each year from 1956 through 
1969, Worcester (47) presented a "maximum defensible" estimate of 
weh:are loss due to monopoly. He assumed for each market that the 
price elasticity of demand was two. Allowances were also made for 
welfare effects which were not directly observable from the data. One 
adjustment was made to account for monopoly pricing of inputs. If 
inputs are priced monopolistically but final products are competitively 
priced, there is not necessarily an increase in the welfare loss. 
However, when there is monopoly pricing of inputs and final products, 
there is an additional loss caused by the economy operating on a lower 
transformation curve. Worcester adjusts his estimated welfare loss by 
a factor of 1.2 to account for higher wages resulting from market power 
in input markets. A second adjustment is made to lower the estimate of 
the normal profit. Since the average return for all of the Fortune 
500 includes monopoly profits, Worcester used 90 percent of the median 
return in order to eliminate, or at least reduce, the effects of monopoly 
profits on the estimate of a normal return. With these adjustments 
Worcester obtained a welfare loss of .443 to .728 percent of national 
income, depending on the year examined. 
31 
Worcester also found the size of the welfare loss to be falling 
over ·the 14-year period. He, therefore, suggested that more effort be 
aimed·at the public sector and the misallocation resulting from such 
policies as quotas, safety standards, and other programs which are 
asserted to be in the public interest. 
The last study to be discussed is one by Siegfried and Tiemann (41). 
Their approach will be presented in somewhat more detail since the 
present study uses their method of calculating the welfare loss due to 
the monopoly price exceeding marginal cost. The basic assumptions 
used in their method are: "(l) variable costs are constant; (2) each 
producer charges the same price and there is no price discrimination; 
(3) the demand curve is linear in the region of actual output; (4) each 
producer is operating at lowest possible cost" (p. 191). 
Referring to Figure 4, the deadweight loss (W) is the area of 
triangle ABE, that is: 
W = 1/2 (AB)(BE). 
The vertical distance AB is found by calculating the difference between 
long run marginal cost and the price, or: 
AB a (TR/Q ) - LRMC. 
m 
In this equation, TR is total revenue, ~ is observed or monopoly output, 
and LRMC is long run marginal cost. Since average costs are assumed to 
be constant, long run average costs can be substi"tuted for marginal 
costs. Because the data used were accounting data, an adjustment was 
made to account for a normal return. Siegfried and Tiemann (41) 
estimated the normal return as the average rate of return on assets for 
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all mining and manufacturing times the book value of assets. 
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Figure 4. Deadweight Welfare Loss 
The distance AB (Figure 4) can now be expressed as: 
AB= <ITR - LRVC - pAl)/Q • 
m 
The variables in the above equation·con.sist of TR which is total revenue; 
LRVC, long run variable cost; p, the estimated normal rate of return; and 
A, the book value of assets. The equation provides an estimate of the 
economic profit per unit. The absolute va.lue of (TR - LRVC - pA) is used 
to take into account the misallocation of resources which results from 
too few resources in those industries with greater than a normal return 
and too many resources where the return is less than a normal return 
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(41, p. 192). From the data~ is not directly observable; therefore, 
the expression (0 ) is multiplied by P /P giving: 111 m m 
AB c CITR - LRVC - pAl)/(TR/Pm). (6) 
The distance BE (Figure 4) is given by: 
BE = AB(dQ/dP). 
In this expression dQ/dP is the inverse of the slope of the demand curve. 
By multiplying by (Pm/Pm) and (~/~), and recognizing the price 
elasticity of demand (E) to be (dQ/dP)(Pm/~), the following expression 
for BE is obtained: 
(7) 
Combining equations 6 and 7 the welfare loss equation becomes: 
W = 1/2 CITR - LRVC - pAl/TR) 2(TR)E. (8) 
With equation 8, it is not necessary to know specific prices or levels 
of output, which validates the use of accounting data from which prices 
and outputs cannot be obtained. 
Siegfried and Tiemann (41) used observations from IRS minor 
industries for 1963, which correspond fairly well to SIC three-digit 
industries. Assuming a price elasticity for all industries of unity, 
the welfare loss estimate for mining and manufacturing was .0734 percent 
of national income. This is consistent with the result of other 
researchers except for Kamerschen. 
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Evaluation of Welfare Loss Studies 
There are several problems associated with welfare loss studies. 
These criticisms are sununarized by Scherer (37, pp. 402-415). 
First, these studies depend upon the assumed price elasticities, 
which except for Kamerschen are in the range of one to two. As equation 
8 would indicate, to the extent that in the long run substitution would 
result in larger elasticities, the welfare loss estimates are biased 
downward for a given difference between the competitive price and the 
monopoly price. In addition, if firms are profit maximizers and if they 
in fact have monopoly power, they would not operate in that portion of 
the demand curve with a price elasticity of i or lower, since this 
implies zero or negative marginal cost. 
Second, the studies are all for manufacturing or manufacturing and 
mining. This results in two problems. Since the average rate of return 
tends to be lower in agriculture, retailing, and services, use of the 
average return in manufacturing biases the normal return upward when the 
results are expanded to include the entire economy (biasing the welfare 
loss downward). Also, using this average return for manufacturing 
understates the monopoly price distortions in manufacturing. 
Third, use of SIC two-digit industries and even the use of three-
and four-digit industries tends to hide monopoly power. It does this by 
hiding monopoly returns for a specific product or product line in 
broadly defined industry averages. A related problem is that because 
the type of inputs used is a factor in determining a SIC code, firms 
producing products which are substitutes may be listed in different 
industries, for example, mobile homes (SIC 3791) and modular homes 
(SIC 2433). This could bias the results either way, but most likely it 
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biases results downward since the data for firms with monopoly power in 
a particular final product market may record only a part of that firm's 
activity in that market, thereby dispersing their monopoly power in the 
data. 
Fourth, some monopoly gains may have been capitalized as costs, 
particularly when assets change hands in a merger. Obviously this 
leads to what would have been monopoly profit being recorded as cost. 
Scherer (37, p. 404) argues that if the above distortions are 
considered, the range for welfare loss is in the range of .5 to 2 percent 
of gross national product. His "best-guess" is 1. 05 percent. 
A final issue concerning these welfare loss estimates is that of 
A-inefficiency (28). Because of the lack of competitive pressure, 
firms with a high degree of monopoly power would tend to tolerate 
inefficiency and waste (X-inefficiency), so that a monopoly would tend 
to operate above the technically possible cost curves. But, welfare 
loss studies estimate actual cost, not competitive cost. Therefore, cost 
is biased upward, leading to an understatement of welfare loss. Scherer 
(37, p. 405) believes that this could account for as much as 10 percent 
of costs. 
The present study of conunercial banking will attempt to avoid three 
of the problems with previous welfare loss studies. First, the price 
elasticity of demand will not be assumed. Rather an attempt is made to 
estimate the price elasticity using regression techniques. This, of 
course, has its own problems, to be discussed later; however, an estimate 
made from industry data should be preferable to an assumption. Simply 
assigning, by assumption, a particular elasticity coefficient to several 
different products may be justifiable if the purpose is to examine the 
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different results as an indicator of the relative magnitudes involved; 
but it is questionable to imply that an assumed elasticity coefficient 
is in fact the actual coefficient and, therefore, allowing an accurate 
estimate of actual welfare loss. If a valid estimating technique is 
used, an elasticity coefficient estimated from data is more likely to 
reflect actual elasticities. 
As Scherer pointed out, past studies have ignored industries other 
than those in the manufacturing and mining sectors. ·Although commercial 
banking is only one part of the financial services sector, it is an 
important part; and a study of commercial banking can contribute to 
analysis of the monopoly problem and to the analysis of industries 
which are characterized by production relationships which are not as 
simple as most manufacturing. 
Finally, by examining the lending activity of commercial banks, the 
problem of hidden monopoly power (e.g., use of SIC codes) is reduced. 
Admittedly this narrow approach will not lend itself to broad conclusions 
about the aggregate effects of monopoly; however, on balance the results 
may be more useful, since they will refer to a particular set of 
identifiable products. The use of commercial banking also is an attempt 
to evaluate the suggestion by Worcester that misallocations by public 
sector activity are important and should receive more attention. 
CHAPTER IV 
COST OF REGULATION: COMMERCIAL BANKING 
The two preceding chapters have presented the basic underlying 
theory concerning the costs of monopoly and a summary of previous 
empirical studies of the problem. The present study is an effort to 
examine the welfare loss due to regulated entry into commercial banking. 
Since regulation in commercial banking restricts entry, both the 
deadweight welfare loss and the competition for monopoly rents are 
important. This chapter will develop a theroetical approach to 
commercial banking. Since commercial banks are multiproduct firms, 
there are problems of identifying the relevant outputs. These problems 
will be discussed including the different approaches taken by other 
researchers. 
The Multiproduct Firm 
The industry to be examined in this study is commercial banking. 
As will be shown in this chapter, banks are multiproduct firms. The 
multiproduct firm can be characterized as using two general methods of 
production. First, the various products may be produced using completely 
different types of production functions, for example, a conglomerate 
firm. Second, the different products may involve techniques involving 
either joint costs or common costs. The products or services produced 
by a commercial bank are characterized, as will be shown, by comm.on 
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costs. Therefore, a brief discussion of both joint and connnon costs 
is useful. 
· Joint production occurs when products can be produced only in fixed 
proportions such that none of the products has a separate cost function 
(23). Where joint production occurs there is no way to attribute part 
of production costs to one of the products and other parts to remaining 
1 products. The economic product, that is the unit of production, is the 
combined output of the various products. Even though buyers may view 
the products as separate, the cost functions (marginal, average and 
total) are relevant to the joint or combined output. Clearly, the 
outputs of commercial banks are not joint. A bank does not have to make 
various types of loans in fixed proportion, but the various loans are 
made using the same basic resources, therefore these costs are connnon. 
When the same resources are used to produce different products and 
when the production of one product uses capacity which would be used to 
produce other products, their costs are connnon (23, p. 78). In other 
words, when it is possible in the short run to shift capital, labor and 
raw materials from producing one product to producing another, the costs 
of the various products are said to be common. Since the same resources 
are used to produce different products, it may appear, as with joint 
costs, that costs cannot be attributed causally to each product. However, 
this is not true. If the proportions of the products.produced can be 
varied, then the products have separate marginal costs (21, p. 79). The 
1 Kahn (23) does demonstrate that separate supply functions based on 
opportunity cost can be derived. However, these supply functions are 
obtained using demand for the separate joint products and the joint 
productions costs; the costS 7 of ·production are not allocated to each 
product. 
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following model shows that it is possible to separate the marginal costs 
of producing several products where the costs are common. 
The analysis of this paper is based on an adaptation of Clemens' 
(8) multiproduct firm model. Assume the firm can produce a variety of 
products arid that the firm's resources are mobile between products. It 
is also assumed that demands are not related. The model is presented in 
Figure 5, assuming three different products and a continuous marginal 
cost curve which is the same for each product. In other words, all 
costs are common in this model. 
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Figure 5. Multiproduct Firm 
For purposes of analysis the demand functions are ranked from left 
to right according to profitability. Profits will be maximized when 
outputs in the three markets are distributed such that marginal revenue 
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in each of the markets equals marginal cost. This value of marginal 
cost and therefore marginal revenue (indicated by EMR for equal marginal 
revenue) is determined by the least profitable market.. The output of 
each product has its own origin at the output of the preceding product. 
For example, the output of product o~e is Q1 ; of product two is Q2 - Q1 ; 
of product three Q3 - Q2 • 
The common cost nature of this model can be seen by assuming a new 
product can be produced whose profitability is greater than the least 
profitable current alternative. This would result in a reduction in the 
output levels of all the current products and the marginal cost of 
producing the new alternative can be related directly to that product. 
At the same time marginal revenue would be raised in all of the markets. 
As one can visualize, this process could result in a raising of marginal 
revenue until the least profitable product was squeezed out of the 
product line (8, p. 270). This same result would occur if marginal 
cost was to increase. For example, in the context of this study, 
rising interest rates, due, for example, to restrictive monetary policy, 
would result in a decrease in available loans for less profitable types 
of loan activity. 
Applying this model to the cost of regulation model of Posner, 
assume that there is constant marginal cost and average cost. Suppose 
also that there are only two common products. Figure 6 shows the 
transfer cost and deadweight loss for each product. In this figure, 
OA is the monopoly output of product l; OB is the competitive output 
of product 1. If product 1 is monopolized the monopoly output of product 
2 is AC; BD is the competitive output if product 1 is also competitive. 
The monopoly prices of products 1 and 2 respectively are E and F, while 
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G is the competitive price for each. If both products are monopolized, 
the transfer cost for product 1 is given by the rectangle GERI; the 
transfer cost for product 2 is INKL. The deadweight loss for product 1 
is !HJ; for 2 it is LKM. 
MC, AC 
0 A B C D 
Quantity/Unit of Time 
Figure 6. Multiproduct Firm and Welfare Loss 
If the restricted entry applies to both products produced, the 
cost of this restricted entry is the sum of the transfer cost for each 
product and the deadweight loss for each. Of course, the model could. 
also be used to examine situations which involve some but not all 
products being sold under conditions of monopoly. 
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Conunercial Banking 
If banks are to be studied, the output of banks must be defined and 
measured. Three major problems exist in defining and measuring bank 
output. First, since bank output is, regardless of the particular 
definition, a combination of various services (such as deposits, loans, 
accounting services, maintaining investment portfolios, and protection 
of valuables), simply measuring any particular service becomes difficult. 
Second, the multiproduct nature of banking involves examining the 
relationships between various outputs, and it must be determined whether 
costs are conunon or joint. Finally, some of the outputs of banks 
represent inputs into other outputs of banks depending on the definition 
of output. This last problem is extremely important in any study of 
banking and depends largely on the. scope of a study. 
There are three approa~hes to determining inputs and outputs (30). 
One of these treats banks as producers of financial intermediation 
services and inputs are then labor and capita; outputs are deposits, 
loans and other financial services. A second approach is a macroeconomic 
one in which the banking system's role in economic activity is stressed 
and loans and investments are inputs, and deposits are outputs. Finally, 
from a microeconomic viewpoint, that is, concentrating on a bank as an 
individual producing unit, deposits are inputs while loans and investments 
are outputs. 
Considering the outputs of banks to be financial intermediation 
was the method of output definition used by four researchers. One of 
the earliest discussions was by Chandler (7) in 1938. Chandler included 
as output: bank loans, deposits and other banking services (p. 1). He 
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did not attempt to justify this view of output, nor was his paper an 
empirical study. The purpose of Chandle.r' s study was simply to explain 
why banking cannot be analyzed using the assumptions of the competitive 
model. Be~ston (6) and Bell and Murphy (3) used both assets and 
liabilities in their studies of bank costs. They also did not attempt 
to justify their view of bank output as financial intermediation. 
A macroeconomic approach to defining bank output was used by 
Schweiger and McGee (39) in their study of banking costs and performances. 
They identified bank size and banking cost in terms of total deposits and 
therefore defined output as total deposits. 
Treating the connnercial bank in a traditional microeconomic sense 
was used in the first study using empirical data and was, according to 
Bell and Murphy (3, p. 5), done in 1954 by Alhadeff (1). Alhadeff 
defined output as total earning assets and used expenses as a proportion 
of investments and loans to measure unit costs. Both Gramley (12) and 
Greenbaum (13) used earning assets to measure output, also taking a 
microeconomic approach. Greenbaum also weighted assets by the average 
interest rate in each category of assets. 
All of the above studies except for Benston (6), and Bell and 
Murphy (3), used accounting data on assets or assets and liabilities to 
measure output. The use of this type of data is not consistent with 
economic theory. That is, the theory of the firm examines the rate of 
output from a firm and is therefore concerned with a flow concept. 
However, assets and liabilities are measures of a stock, that is, most 
of the size of any particular asset is a result of past activity, not 
related to the present. Therefore, stud1es which use a stock concept 
when what is required is a flow concept may obtain poor results. 
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Benston, and Bell and Murphy, attempted to avoid this problem by defining 
output as an account and by using the average number of accounts 
processed in each output category, thereby using a flow rather than a 
stock. Their use of the number of accounts has one other advantage in 
that much of the costs of a unit of output, whether it be a loan or a 
deposit, are not a function of the dollar amount but instead these costs 
are simply a result of processing another account. (If data on assets 
and liabilities 'could be obtained weekly or monthly a flow measure could 
be developed by looking at differences from one period to the next; 
however, as is discussed later, data ·Of this type are not available.) 
The present study uses assets as a measure of output., even though 
this means that a stock rather than a flow is used. This introduces a 
serious problem with the estimating procedures presented in detail in 
Chapter V basically involve estimating marginal costs and average 
interest rates from year end balances on various types of loans. 
However, those year end balances consist of loans made during the year 
under study and loans made during previous years. Therefore, the 
estimates obtained may be over or underestimated. The use of an account, 
as discussed in the preceding paragraph, tends to avoid this stock-flow 
problem. The use of an account is perhaps justifiable if the object 
of a study is to examine the nature of the cost functions facing 
commercial banking. However, an account is inadequate if banking 
markets are to be studied, that is, both buyers and sellers of bank 
services. The definition of any product must reflect buyers' preferences. 
The use of an account does not, in most cases, reflect what it is that 
buyers are buying from a commercial bank. When an individual obtains 
a loan he is buying the use of some number of dollars for a specified 
45 
period of time. He is not buying an amount. In addition, the number of 
dollars paid for the use of a loan is related to the size and length of 
the loan. If, then, any analysis of demand is to be made in connnercial 
banking, the unit of output cannot be considered to be an account. 
Even though the use of asset information is inconsistent with economic 
theory, i.e., the use of a stock rather than a flow, given available 
data asset information best reflects what consumers are buying from a 
connnercial bank. 
This study views banks in a microeconomic sense. There are two 
broad categories of output considered: first, private lending activity; 
second, non-lending activity. Only private lending activity is considered 
because it is not likeiy that comniercial banks have monopoly power in the 
purchase of governmental securities. Governmental secu~ities (treasury 
securities, U.S. government agency securities, and state and political 
subdivision securities) are used in allocating cost.to the various 
services, as is non-lending activity. The emphasis is on private lending 
activity as the primary activity of a bank. In a sense, banks, as such, 
are not to be studied; instead particular types of loans which banks make 
are the object. The following loans are defined to be the outputs of 
commercial banks: (1) loans to financial institutions; (2) loans to 
purchase or carry securities; (3) loans to farmers; (4) commercial and 
industrial loans; (5) installment loans; (6) real estate loans; (7) single 
payment loans; and (8) other loans. As discussed in the next chapter, 
these particular loan categories are used because data are available 
under this type of classification. Inputs into this production are 
capital, labor, deposits and materials. 
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Economic theory demonstrates the proposition that if entry into an 
industry is restricted to some level below that which would occur under 
competition, then it is likely that mono~oly power will be created or 
increased in that industry. The effects on social welfare may be the 
same regardless of whether entry restriction occurs because of techno:-
logical factors, actions of existing firms, or regulation. Connnercial 
banking seems to have had relatively restrictive regulation of new 
entry into banking since the 1935 Banking Act. If this regulation has 
in fact restricted entry into banking, then one would expect there to 
be costs to society resulting from monopoly creation. Peltzman (34) 
has estimated that from 1935 to 1962 there were 2,200 fewer new banks 
than would have been formed in the absence of regulation. Therefore, 
it is hypothesized here that creation of monopoly power due to bank 
regulation has generated social costs. 
In order to apply the theory of the social cost of monopoly to 
cormnercial banking, assume initially that banks produce a single type 
of loan R, with constant costs, and that the analysis is for a single 
period. Demand for loans is a function of the rate of interest. The 
quantity of loans made is measured as the dollar value of the loans. 
Since a unit of output is measured as one dollar, demand can also be 
considered a function of the cent price so that, for example, an 
interest rate of 5 percent per unit of time is also 5 cents per unit or 
dollar. Figure 7 shows this demand, average cost, and the cost of 
regulation. Cost is also shown as a rate of interest. The monopoly 
rate of interest is r ; the competitive rate r • The average cost is 
m c 
also r • The transfer cost and deadweight loss are given by T and c 
W respectively. 
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Figure 7. Welfare Loss 
Assume now that the firm is a multiproduct bank and that the 
marginal cost of each type of loan is different. Let the bank be 
producing loans R1 , R2 , and R3• Adapting the multiproduct model of 
Clemens (7), a portion of the bank's cost for making loans is connnon in 
that a portion of cost is constant per unit for any of the three outputs 
but the amount of each output can be varied, and if the output of one is 
increased the output of the others must be decreased, holding input 
quantities constant. The primary types of cost being considered are the 
costs of deposits (primarily interest costs) and costs of certain types 
of labor inputs. For example, deposits allow a bank' to make loans; 
but regardless of whether the loans are to purchase a new car, a home, 
or a business firm, the cost of deposits per dollar of loans is constant. 
However, because of different processing costs and different levels of 
risk for different types of loans, the marginal cost of each type of 
loan is different, but assumed constant for each. 
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Since the cost of deposits is constant regardless of the type of 
loan made, the only variables affecting types of loans differently are 
the processing costs (forms, personnel, and credit checks) and the 
different levels of risk which may exist for different types of loans. 
The cost of the necessary forms and credit checks clearly would be· 
largely constant per loan of each type. Since the risk factor is 
primarily applied to types of loans or groups of individuals, it can be 
expected to be constant. ·The only substantial problem with this 
constant cost assumption is that output is measured in units of.one 
dollar in loans. Since loans vary in size and the cost differences are 
mainly p.on.stant per loan, the cost per dollar may vary. 
The relevant cost and demand curves are depicted in Figure 8. In 
Figure 8, ACc represents comm.on costs while AC1 is the marginal cost for 
R1 , AC 2 for R2, and AC3 for R3• Each of these latter three curves 
includes AC • The transfer loss and deadweight loss for each type 
c 
of loan are shown assuming loans R1 , R2 , and R3• Demand and marginal 
revenue curves for each output are n1 ~ n2, n3, and MR1 , MR.2 , and MR.3 !°or 
.R1 , R2, and R3 respectively. The cost curves show both the processing 
and risk costs of each loan plus common costs. Each output has its own 
origin which begins at the output level of the preceding output. The 
output of R1 is OA1 ; the output of R2 is A1A2; ·the outpat of· R3 is .A2A3• 
The respective interest rates are r 1 , r 2 , and r 3• Total loans are OA3• 
It may appear that there is some double counting; however, there is not 
since zero output for R1 is at the origin, zero output for R2 is at A1 , 
and zero output for R3 is at A2• The cost of regulation can be calcu-
lated for each of the output measures. Let T1 , T2, T3 and w1 , w2, and 
w3 be the transfer cost and deadweight loss respectively for the three 
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loans. The total social cost of regulation (SC) for these outputs then 
would be: 
That is, the total social cost of regulation is the sum of the transfer 
cost for each loan plus the sum of the deadweight loss for each loan. 
This model differs from the basic Clemens (8) model in that marginal 
revenue is not equal for each type of loan. This difference exists 
because the basic model assumes all costs are common, while in this 
adaptation the marginal cost of each type of loan is allowed to vary. 
0 Al A2 A3 
Loans in Dollars (R1 , R2, R3)/Unit of Time 
Figure 8. Welfare Loss--Commercial Banking 
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There are three important costs of regulation which are ignored in 
this analysis, and, therefore, in this study. One is simply the 
continuing costs of reporting to regulatory agencies which tends to 
shift the cost curves upward and would therefore be missed in this 
analysis. Second, there may. be substantial X-inefficiency as a result 
of regulation. There are two aspects to this X-inefficiency. As 
discussed in the preceding chapter, the lack of competitive pressure may 
result in inefficiency and waste. In addition, even though rates of 
return are not regulated, interest rates for loans and deposits are, 
which may result in overuse of capital as a method of reducing or hiding 
profit and, since interest on deposits is regulated, as a method of 
competing for deposits. This X-inefficiency also tends to result in 
higher cost curves which cannot be adequately accounted for in this 
analysis. Finally, the interest regulation of deposits in commercial 
banking and other financial institutions results in an additional 
transfer to the banking industry (due to monopoly power through regula-
tion) which is taken into account by the analysis if the supply of 
deposits is perfectly inelastic with respect to the interest rate paid 
on those deposits. In other words, if the interest ceiling of deposits 
alters depositors' decisions concerning present or future consumption 
(i.e., less than perfect inelasticity) then the analysis will not 
properly account for the resulting misallocation of resources. 
Summary 
This chapter has presented a basic analysis of the multiproduct 
firm as proposed by Clemens (8). The analysis is then applied to 
commercial banking. The resulting model of commercial banking differs 
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from that proposed by Clemens because the marginal cost of providing 
different types of loans is not the same. From this model it is 
relatively simple to identify the transfer loss and deadweight welfare 
loss for each type of loan. The next chapter will develop the techniques 
for estimating the various cost and revenue variables of the multiproduct 
firm model for commercial banking. 
CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The principle objectives of this study are to obtain estimates of 
the deadweight welfare loss due to monopoly power in the lending 
activity of commercial banks and of the transfer of consumers' surplus. 
As discussed earlier, once the welfare loss or the transfer is obtained 
the other can be calculated. The deadweight welfare loss will first be 
esdmated using the approach of Siegfried and Tiemann, then the transfer 
cost will be calculated using the relationship derived by Posner. 
The data used in this study were obtained from the Kansas City 
Federal Reserve Bank, Tenth Federal Reserve District for the years 1971-
1975. The data consist of year end balances for the following categories: 
loans to financial institutions, loans to purchase and carry securities, ' 
farm loans, commercial and industrial loans, installment loans, real 
estate loans, single payment loans, other loans, total assets, operating 
expenses, interest and fees on loans, treasury securities, U.S. govern-
ment agency securities, and state and political subdivision securities. 
Because of disclosure regulations, each observation consists of the 
above categories for each county (rather than each bank) in the district 
which had three or more banks. Counties with less than three banks are 
aggregated into a single observation for each state in the tenth district. 
The estimates of the deadweight welfare loss and the transfer cost are 
made for 1975, and consist of 316 observations (counties). The 
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particular categories used as independent variables (output) for the 
revenue estimates are the first eight categories listed above, i.e., 
private loans which were also listed in Chapter IV. 
The data do not contain revenue by type of asset or loan, therefore 
an estimate must be obtained. The technique to estimate revenue for 
each type of loan will also give the actual or monopoly interest rate. 
The technique to estimate the marginal cost of each type of loan will 
also give the competitive interest rate. 
Interest Rates, Revenue, and Elasticity 
The model used in this study to estimate from asset information 
the total revenue from different types of loans is one proposed by 
Hester and Zoellner (17) and also used by Greenbaum (13). Using the 
reciprocal of square root of the number of banks in each county to 
' 1 
weight the equation in order to reduce the effects of heteroskedasticity, 
the estimating equation is: 
(9) 
where: 
TRj is total loan revenue for the jth county, 
Rij is asset size for the . th J county, th i loan, 
ri is the regression coefficient (also interp~eted as the interest 
rate}, 
1 According to Johnston (21, p. 229) grouped data, such as the county 
data in this study, would be homoskedastic if each group contained the 
same number of observations. Grouping which consists of an unequal number 
of observations is therefore a source of heteroskedastic~ty, hence, the 
use of the reciprocal of square root of the number of banks in each 
county (observations) as weights. 
54 
th NBj is the number of banks in the j county, and 
u is the error term. 
The term riRij in equation 9 is interpreted as the total revenue 
from a par.ticular. type of loan, and there is no intercept term. Once 
the r 1 1 s are obtained, an estimate of total revenue for the loss equation 
can be calculated by using total asset size for each output for the 
entire federal reserve district, i.e., ri ~ ~ Rij' where j = 1, ••• , N 
i j 
(where N is the total number of counties in the district). Of course 
this interest rate, ri, is the average interest rate. 
The price elasticity is to be estimated rather than assumed. 
Ideally the above regression (equation 9) could be repeated for a period 
of quarters for the counties in the sample, thereby creating an interest 
rate series from which the elasticity could be estimated. However, data 
are not available for revenue information on a quarterly basis; therefore, 
•. " 
the! following method is used. Five random samples are created from the 
data for each of the five years, giving a total of 25 samples. For each 
of these samples, the regression given by equation 9 is run to create an 
interest rate series. Once these 25 rates are obtained, the following 
regression is used to obtain the interest elasticities: 
(10) 
where: 
Xi is total asset size for each type of loan i and for a given year 
for all the banks in the sample from which each of the 25 r 1 's 
are estimated, and · 
Y is average per capita income from the district for the year from 
which each sample is obtained; Y is constant in each sample. 
From this regression, equation 10, the estimate of a2 is the 
partial derivative of x1 with respect to ri. Since the definition of 
elasticity is Er - caxi/ari)ri/Xi' the interest elasticity is simply 
a2ri/Xi' where ri is the estimated interest rate for loan i in 1975, 
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and xi is the average size of loan i for 1975 in the tenth district. 
This method for determining interest elasticity does involve one serious 
problem; it is that the estimates of a2 (i.e., the partial derivatives) 
are not consistent. The following presents the problem according to 
Johnston (21), and a solution. 
From the regression equation 10, (where Y is the matrix of per 
capita incomes, and r is the matrix of estimated interest rates) if the 
estimator a2 were unbiased, the plim a2 • A2 , where A2 is the true value. 
However, because the ri's are obtained from previaus regressions (equa-
tion 9), then r = r + v, where r is the matrix of true values and vis 
the matrix of measurement errors. In this case the plim A2 = A2 ~ plim 
-1 2 2 (r'r/n) crvA2, where according to Johnston crv is the variance of v, 
(21, p. 283) so a2 is not consistent. The following can be used to 
correct the estimate of a2• 
Let nplim(r'r/n)-l = c, (obtained from the (X'X)-l matrix, where 
X • (Y,r) 
plim a2 = 
then, plim a2 = 
2 plim a/ (l-cO"v) 
2 2 A2(1-ccrv). Define a2 • a2/(l-ccrv); so 
= plim A2 (1-ccr;)/(l"".'C0~) .. A2• The estimators 
2 
a2 can then be adjusted by dividing by 1-ccrv. 
The estimating techniques to this point provide the neeessary 
revenue and demand elements, that is, estimates of total revenue and 
interest elasticity. All that is needed now are estimates of marginal 
costs. 
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Cost Estimates 
In estimating the various cost elements of the welfare loss equation, 
the underlying production is assumed to be one in which output is a 
function of deposit liabilities, labor input and capital (all other 
inputs), i.e., 
Qi a f(D, L, K), 
where: 
Qi is the amount of loans of type i, 
D is deposits, demand and time, 
L is the labor input, and 
K is the capital input. 
Output consists of various types of loans. Therefore this approach, 
as pointed out by Greenbaum (13), generally uses the right hand side of 
a bank's balance sheet as a measure of input use and earning assets as 
a measure of bank output. 
As with the demand estimates, output is simply defined as loans of 
various types as they appear on a bank's balance sheet. There are, 
however, two additions to output for cost purposes. First, the size of 
government securities is included to allocate costs to this type of 
activity. Second, because of the problem of defining the output of 
trust departments, safe deposit boxes and other bank services, a proxy 
for nonlending activity is used. This proxy is the difference between 
total operating income and income from loans. This difference is used 
as a proxy on the assumption that the prices of these activities in a 
given bank are relatively stable so that income earned can be used as a 
measure of output. The cost equation to be estimated for 1975 is: 
where: 
TCj is total operating cost for the jth county, 
Aj is total assets for the jth county, 
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Rij is total loans of type i, jth county including govern-
government securities, 
Nj is nonlending output for the jth county, 
'Ba, ai' and g are regression coefficients, and 
. th 
NBj is the number of banks in the j county; used to 
weight the equation. 
Most of the variables in equation 11 are self-explanatory, but 
conunent is required on several of the variables. Although all types of 
government securities were excluded from the revenue estimates, they must 
be included in the cost equation in order to allocate operating expense 
to all the revenue earning activities of commercial banking. The variable 
N., nonlending output, as described in the preceding paragraph, consists 
J 
of total operating income less the income from loans, including govern-
ment securities. The term Aj is used to capture any common costs not 
estimated by the other regression coefficients. The reason for using 
Aj rather than an intercept term is that the costs of any firm must be 
related to the purchase of resources; and even though it is common 
practice to include an intercept; it is difficult to provide a theoretical 
basis for its inclusion. The following estimates can be identified from 
equation 11: (1) the cost attributable directly to each type of loan is 
ai (average and marginal cost). times the sum of loans of type i for the 
tenth district, and (2) the cost attributable to common inputs and 
captured by ai is B0 t Ai. 
j 
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The use of the regression in this manner assumes constant costs, 
i.e., the absence of scale economies. The existence of economies of 
scale appears fairly well established; for example, Alhadeff (1), 
Greenbaum (13), Benston (6), Gramley (12), and Bell and Murphy (3) found 
scale economies in commercial banking. However, the output definition 
, which they used are not consistent with each other nor with the 
definition used in this study. 
There are several reasons for assuming constant costs in this study. 
The most obvious reason is the simplicity of the assumption and the fact 
that the linear regression coefficients can be interpreted as per-unit 
costs. In addition past research lends support to the constant cost 
assumption. 
Bell and Murphy (3), using an account as output, did find economies 
of scale to exist. However, except for relatively small banks, as the 
number of accounts processed increased the additional cost savings fell. 
In other words, scale economies were not very large except for small 
banks. They conclude that if "a typical bank were to expand all its 
activities (functions or products) within its existing facilities by 
10 percent, total cost would rise by 9.3 percent ••• " (p. 68). Although 
output is measured differently from the present study, the general 
conclusions should hold, particularly in the light of other research on 
the subject. 
Various studies of scale economies in commercial banking were 
summarized by Greenbaum (14), In addition to the studies already 
mentioned earlier in this study (1, .6, 12, 13, 17, 39), he also discussed 
the results of an article by Horvitz (19), Although the definitions 
of output used by different researchers are not the same, some 
conclusions can be made concerning the existence of scale economies. 
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Economies of scale were found to be important up to total deposits 
of ·$5 million by both Alhadeff and Horvitz (14, pp. 466-467). Part this 
relatively small size costs were fairly constant up to about $500 
million in total deposits. Also consistent with Alhadeff and Horvitz 
are the findings of Benston, who found the "efficiency of operations is 
not largely a function of bank size" (p. 471). Somewhat different 
results were obtained by Schweiger and McGee, who found that scale 
economies exist up to $50 million in deposits (p. 468). Although scale 
economies apparently exist, the relative importance of these economies 
is not clear. Greenbaum (14, p. 473) concluded that significant 
economies can be obtained up to $10 million in assets (p. 473). Since 
the studies discussed by him use deposits rather than total assets,.· it 
· is not clear how he arrives at his conclusion. 
Based on Greenbaum's conclusion, and since the average Tenth 
District bank has $22 million in assets in 1975, most banks in the 
Tenth District, while small, are in the horizontal portion of their cost 
curves, assuming that there are not additional economies until banks 
are very large. If this assumption is valid, then there are two 
considerations which indicate that a constant cost assumption is valid 
for the Tenth Federal Reserve District. First, since banking markets 
are relatively small both in geographic area and in terms of loan demand 
and deposits, whether or not economies of scale exist is not overly 
important since in terms of plant economies substantial additional cost 
savings can only be obtained in the larger markets. Therefore, banks 
face monopoly or oligopoly situations in which per unit costs of 
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different banks are approximately the same. The particular markets are 
not large enough to allow a single bank to become dominant based on 
economies of scale. In a study which crosses individual market 
boundaries, the existence of scale economies should not seriously bias 
regression results since many of these markets are not large enough to 
support a scale which can take advantage of the cost savings. Second, 
if a large firm is to move into specific local banking markets, it must 
open branch banks. Several researchers have found that branch banks 
either have higher costs than similar unit banks (3, 4, 13) or roughly 
equal costs. This latter conclusion is that of Greenbaum (13), 
particularly in banks which are not extremely small or large (very 
small or large branch banks have higher costs). Since Greenbaum's 
definition of output is closest to the one used in this study, it will 
be assumed that branch banking (where it exists) has no effect on the 
cost estimates obtained from this study. Greenbaum also found that if 
cost curves for banks which were not large or small were estimated, the 
cost curves were linear (p. 427), The conclusion drawn from the above 
is that even though markets may have banks of varying scale, the 
assumption of constant costs does not seriously bias results. Any bias 
which does result is on the conservative side, that is, overestimating 
cost and underestimating the cost of regulation. 
The welfare loss equation requires, in addition to revenue and price 
elasticity, long run variable cost and the normal return. Long run 
variable cost can be estimated for each output i using the relationship 
below: 
where: 
is total assets for the tenth district, 
is total loans of type i for the tenth district, 
is ERij/E E Rij' where EE Rij is total loans of all types 
i j i j 
for the tenth district, and 
ai is the direct cost of each type of loan. 
The factor K is introduced to allocate common costs (B0 ~A.) in a j J 
proportional tna.nner to each output measure. 
The normal rate of return must not be determined. At first it 
might seem to be contained within B0A; however, since the accounting 
data from which total cost is obtained do not contain the return to 
OWLLers, the normal return must be estimated some other way. This 
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problem is to be solved by determining the average return to commercial 
banking and adding this to the estimate of LRVC. The estimate will be 
made by calculating an average of before tax profits as a percentage 
of total assets for 1971 through 1975 using commercial banks. This cost 
will be allocated in the same manner as common costs; that is, the normal 
return for each type of loan is pKi' where p is the normal return and 
Ki is the proportionality factor introduced earlier. 
Cost of Regulation 
The welfare loss equation given previously is: 
W = 1/2 (jTR - LRVC - pAj)/TR2E(TR). 
All of the elements of this equation may be estimated, as explained, for 
each output measure. The actual equations for each output (loan) i are: 
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Again K is used to allocate those costs which are common. The estimate 
of the normal return may be slightly overestimated because of nonlending 
activity being included is total assets. Total welfare loss is simply 
the sum of wi' i.e., W • E wi. 
i 
The cost of monopoly due to the competition of entrants to obtain 
the potential monopoly profits for each output is: 
In this equation ki is rci/rmi; the competitive price or interest rate 
divided by the monopoly interest rate for each loan. The estimate of 
the monopoly interest rate is the regression coefficient obtained from 
the revenue estimates ri. The competitive price is obtained from the 
cost estimates and is: 
The first two elements (ai + B0Ki) together represent average variable 
cost; the ratio p E Aj/E E Rij is employed to convert the normal return 
j i j ·. 
on assets to per unit of output and Ki is used to allocate the normal 
return among different outputs. The assumption in this case is, of 
course, that in the long run under competitive conditions price will 
equal long run average cost. The estimate of ki becomes: 
The social cost of monopoly is then the sum of the transfer cost and 
deadweight loss: 
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(12) 
Summary 
To sunnnarize the estimating techniques, to obtain the necessary 
revenue data (interest rates on loans, and total revenue on each type of 
loan) a linear regression is used with total revenue as the dependent 
variable and the size of the different types of loans as the independent 
variable. The regression coefficients obtained are the average interest 
rates and the product of these rates and respective loan sizes are the 
revenue obtained from each type of loan. A similar regression is used to 
obtain the per unit (dollar) cost of loans. The cost regression used 
operating expenses as the dependent variable and as independent variables 
the size of the different types of loans, nonlending output, government 
securities and total assets. Total assets are used to capture any 
common costs not reflected by the regression coefficients on loans. 
The regression coefficients from the cost equation are interpreted as 
per unit (dollar) costs. Once the revenue and cost estimates are 
obtained, the equation of Siefried and Teimann is used to calculate the 
deadweight welfare loss and the relationship of Posner's between the 
transfer and deadweight loss is used to calculate the transfer cost. 
The sum of the transfer cost and welfare loss is the social cost of 
regulated entry. 
CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results of the model developed in the 
preceding chapters. First, the estimated interest rates on loans and 
the estimated marginal cost (average cost) on loans are presented. From 
these estimates elasticities are calculated, and the deadweight welfare 
loss and the transfer cost are calculated. 
As discussed in Chapter V, the data used were obtained from the 
Tenth Federal Reserve District. Table I contains the district totals 
for the categories of data needed to make the necessary estimates for 
1975. 
Interest Rates and Marginal Cost 
The results of the regression (equation 9) to determine the average 
interest rate, i.e., the monopoly interest rate, are presented in 
Table II. All of the estimates interest rates are significantly different 
from zero at the .05 level. 
Table III contains the results of the regression (equation 11) to 
1 
estimate long run costs. Only two of these cost estimates present 
difficulties, i.e., the cost estimates for total assets and for loans to 
1 Regressions were also performed without assets in the equation and 
with a vertical intercept. In both cases, several of the estimated 
coefficients were not significantly greater than zero. 
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Operating Expenses 
TABLE I 
* DISTRICT TOTALS 
Interest and Fees on Loans 
Loans to Financial Institutions 
Loans to Purchase and Carry Securities 
Farm Loans 
Commercial and Industrial Loans 
Real Estate Loans 
Single Payment Loans 
Other Loans 
Treasury Securities 
U.S. Government Agency Securities 
State and Political Subdivision Securities 
Installment Loans 
Total Loans 
Total Assets 
* 
$ 2,879,570 
2,146,571 
641,462 
509,641 
4,625,268 
7,114,315 
4,702,722 
1,395,038 
390,696 
4,717,055 
2,133,782 
6,544,218 
4,903,128 
24,282,839 
49,193,068 
Data in thousands of dollars; number of banks--2-,196. 
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TABLE II 
* AVERAGE INTEREST RATES--1975 
Equation 9: TRj /vNBj = ~ riRij /~ + u 
R2 "" • 99795 
Type of Loan 
Loans to Financial Institutions 
Loans to Purchase and Carry Securities 
Farm Loans 
Conunercial and Industrial Loans 
Installment Loans 
Real Estate Loans 
Single Payment Loans 
Other Loans 
* 
Interest Rate (r) 
.06238237 
(4.59) 
.12704934 
(10.35) 
.07528429 
(39.64) 
.07728364 
(24. 96) 
.10853908 
(21. 98) 
.08939515 
(20.12) 
.08065970 
(9.03) 
• 21986737 
(6. 92) 
Number in parentheses is the value of the t-test. 
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TABLE III 
* AVERAGE (MARGINAL) COST PER DOLLAR LOANED--1975 
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Equation 11: TCj/INBj = BOAj/INBj + ~ aiRij/INBj + gNj/INBj + u 
R2 = .997611 
Type of Output 
Total Assets 
Non-lending Output 
Loans to Financial Institutions 
Farm Loans 
Loans to Purchase and Carry Securities 
Connnercial and Industrial Loans 
Installment Loans 
Real Estate Loans 
Single Payment Loans 
Other Loans 
Treasury Securities 
U.S. Government Agency Securities 
State and Local Securities 
* . 
Marginal Cost 
-.00068744 
(-.11) 
.85808687 
(9.8) 
-.05182029 
(-2.02) 
.05159532 
(8.13) 
.19092648 
(9.04) 
.05218382 
(5.17) 
.11068485 
(10.89) 
.09025551 
(10.99) 
.04489120 
(2.36) 
.58464681 
(11. 42) 
.05249287 
(4.93) 
.03501568 
(2. 96) 
.03086050 
(2.79) 
Number in parentheses is the value of the t test. 
financial institutions. Both of these regression coefficients have a 
negative sign. 
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The negative sign on total assets may indicate some econ.omies of 
scale (recall that assets are included to account for common costs not 
captured by the other variables) which seems probable; however, the 
value of the t test is very small and indicates that the hypothesis 
that the coefficient is not significantly different from zero should 
not be rejected. In addition the size of the coefficient is very small. 
Because of these considerations the calculations of cost will not include 
a factor for assets, except for the normal return. 
The negative sign on the cost coefficient for loans to financial 
institutions is also an interesting result. Based on the value of the 
t test, the hypothesis that the estimate is not different from zero can 
be rejected at the .05 level, but a negative marginal cost is difficult 
to interpret. The prime source of this negative marginal cost may be 
that the data consist of year end data, that is, a stock rather than a 
flow. This problem may·also expain other poor results to be discussed 
later. The only other ·explanation would seem to be the reasons such 
loans are made. Without detailed information concerning the reasons 
for these loans, analysis is not possible; therefore, loans to financial 
institutions were dropped from the analysis of this study. 
The cost coefficients estimated for the rest of the output measures 
in Table III are significantly different from zero at the .05 level, and 
so are interpreted as accurately reflecting the per dollar cost of these 
loans. There are still some problems with these estimates when compared 
to the interest rates and these are discussed later in this chapter. 
69 
Interest Elasticities 
The method for estimating the interest elasticities proposed 
earlier {pages 54-55) was abandoned. Two attempts were made to create 
an interest rate series from which elasticities could be estimated. 
One attempt involved creating ten samples for each of five years (1971-
1975) for the tenth district; the second attempt used only five samples 
for each year. In both cases some of the estimated interest rates were 
negative and not significant. Since the estimates were positive and 
significant for 1975 when the entire district was used But not for 
smaller samples, it would appear that the samples simply were not large 
enough. Increasing the number of the samples was not done a third time 
because the number of observations used to obtain the elasticities 
would have been very small. Again the source of these problems may be 
due to using stock variables. If flow variables could have been 
obtained the technique to estimate elasticities may have provided better 
results. 
After the proposed method for estimating elasticities was dropped, 
the method used by Kamerschen {equation 5) was adopted. Use of this 
approach requires that it be assumed that not only firm but also 
industry profit maximization is attained. Although this assumption 
(actual firm and industry profit maximization) may be questionable, there 
is no other alternative if estimates of elasticities are to be used 
rather than assuming elasticities. There are possible adverse effects 
on the elasticity estimates if firms do not maximize their profits. 
Recalling equation 5, E • P/(P - MC) and substituting the interest rate 
for P, the results are: first, if the actual interest rate is below 
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the profit maximizing rate the elasticity will be overestimated; 
second, if the actual interest rate is above the profit maximizing 
rate the elasticity will be underestimated. 
The resulting price elasticity estimates using the approach of 
Kamerschen are shown in Table IV. The price elasticity estimates were 
not made for four of the eight types of loans used in this study. As 
previously discussed, loans to financial institutions were dropped 
because of the negative marginal cost, while the other three loans (loans 
to purchase and carry securities, installment loans, real estate loans, 
and other loans) had marginal cost estimates which exceed the interest 
rate. Although a misallocation of resources also results when marginal 
cost is less than the interest rate, (the basic welfare loss equation, 
equation 8, used in this paper is still relevant) price elasticities 
cannot be estimated using the present method since a prof it maximizing 
firm would not sell at a price which was less than marginal cost. 
TABLE IV 
* INTEREST ELASTICITIES 
Loans to Financial Institutions MC is negative 
Loans to Purchase and Carry Securities 
Farm Loans 
omitted; 
omitted; 
-3.18 
MC greater than r 
Commercial and Industrial Loans 
Installment Loans 
Real Estate Loans 
Single Payment Loans 
Other Loans 
* Elasticity Equation is: E = r/(r - MC). 
-3.08 
omitted; 
omitted; 
-2.25 
omitted; 
MC greater than r 
MC greater than r 
MC greater than r 
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Two of the loans for which interest elasticities cannot be estimated 
are not important relative to total loans. These are loans to purchase 
and carry securities (2.1 percent of tenth district total) and other 
loans (1.6 percent of tenth district total). At test was done to see 
if the estimated marginal cost was significantly different from the 
estimated interest rate for each loan. In both bases the marginal cost 
is significantly different from the interest rate (t = -3.024 for loans 
to purchase and carry securities; t • -7.128 for other loans). The 
existence of loans being made below cost is strange; however, these two 
types of loans are somewhat special categories and may tend to be made 
as a special service to banking customers. ·of course, these strange 
results may also be due to the use of stock variables in the regression 
equations. However, without flow variables it simply is not possible 
to know exactly how the results are affected using stock variables. 
Although there is no reason to doubt the results on these two loans, 
except for the stock-flow problem, ·they will be dropped from further 
analysis because of the inability to measure the interest elasticities 
using the present method. 
The estimates of marginal cost for real estate and for installment 
loans are .also above the estimated interest rates. The cost of install-
ment loans exceeds the interest rate by .2 percent or .2 cents per dollar. 
The difference for real estate loans is .08 percent or .08 cents per 
dollar. The interest rate and marginal cost differences are small and 
so in a practical sense one could argue that the interest rates are 
equal to the marginal costs of these loans. In addition, performing a 
t test on the hypothesis that there is no significant difference between 
marginal costs and the interest rates is consistent with the existence 
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of interest rates being equal to marginal cost. That is, for installment 
loans the test statistic is t • .211; for real estate loans, t = .105. 
Since the interest and cost estimates are significant and since the above 
t tests indicate the interest rates are not different from marginal costs 
and given the complexity of banking costs, particularly in allocating 
connnon inputs, it would seem reasonable to conclude that on the average 
for 1975, banks in the Tenth District intentionally made these two loans 
at cost. 
The existence of loans which are made at cost is not at variance 
with the theoretical model used in this study; in fact, it is a logical 
conclusion of the model. The model, i.e., Clemens' (8) multiproduct 
firm model, shows that as a bank continues to provide loans of less and 
less profitable types, the interest rate charged will approach the 
marginal cost of these loans. For example, if profitability ranges from 
products which are monopolized to those sold under perfectly competitive 
conditions (zero profit), marginal revenue would equal price and there-
fore price would equal marginal cost. (In the basic Clemens' model 
marginal cost and marginal revenue is determined by the least profitable 
product.) Within any multiproduct firm it can be expected that the 
price of some products will approach the marginal cost of those products. 
There are two additional points concerning the making of loans at cost. 
First, both installment and real estate loans are, according to the 
regression results, two of the more costly loans made and therefore 
interest charges are more likely to approach any interest limits placed 
on loans by state usury laws. Second, the Tenth District is largely 
rural and so has a large number of rural banks. These rural banks are 
more likely to be aware of the monopoly grant of their charters and so 
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are also likely to make loans which may not be profitable but are 
expected by the public and regulatory agencies. Adding to this tendency 
is the closer personal relationship between bank managers and individual 
customers. 
There are eight loan categories used in this study. Of these eight, 
three categories, which account for only 7.5 percent of the district 
total, have been eliminated from further analysis. These loans are 
loans to financial institutions (eliminated because of negative marginal 
cost), and other loans, and loans to purchase and carry securities 
(eliminated because of the inability to estimate interest elasticities). 
Therefore the results are relevant to approximately 92.5 percent of 
total loans made in the Tenth District. 
The interest elasticities are presented in Table IV. These 
elasticities were calculated using the interest rates from Table II and 
the marginal costs from Table III. Because the interest rate-marginal 
cost difference is not significantly different from zero, the estimates 
for installment loans and other loans were not made, The implication 
is, of course, that there are no social.costs associated with these 
loans. The interest elasticities are -3.18 for farm loans; -3.08 for 
connnercial and industrial loans; -2.25 for single payment loans. 
The last datum needed for the welfare loss estimate is the average 
rate of return on assets for conunercial banking. Using Moody's Bank 
and Financial Manual (31), a five year simple average for 1971 through 
1975 was obtained and is .0096 cents per dollar of assets. 
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Welfare Loss 
Using the deadweight welfare loss equation (equation 8) the dead-
weight welfare loss was calculated and is presented in Table V. Table V 
includes all the estimated values required for the calculations plus the 
competitive interest rate with the last row, wi, being the welfare loss 
for each of the three types of loans for which an estimate was made. 
Recalling that ri is the monopoly interest rate and ric the 
competitive rate, farm loans had a monopoly rate of interest which was 
36 percent higher than the competitive rate. A 36 percent higher 
interest rate is substantial and resulted in a deadweight welfare loss 
of $1,882,400 or .54 percent of total income from farm loans. 
The monopoly interest rate on commercial and industrial loans was 
37 percent higher than the competitive rate. The resulting deadweight 
welfare loss was $4,850,428 or .88 percent of income earned on these 
loans. 
Finally, single payment loans had a monopoly interest rate which 
was 75 percent higher than the competitive rate. The result of this 
higher rate was a deadweight welfare loss of $5,193,240 or 4.6 percent 
of single payment loan income. 
The total deadweight welfare loss for the Tenth District in 1975 is 
$11,926,068. This welfare loss is .56 percent of total income earned on 
these three types of loans. 
Transfer Cost 
The transfer cost was calculated using equation 4 and is presented 
in Table VI. Table VI includes all the information needed to calculate 
.·TABLE V 
DEADWEIGHT WELFARE LOSS 
Welfare Loss Equation: 2 w. = 1/2((TR. - (p Z:: A.)K. - ai Z:: R .. )/TR.) E. (TR.) 
l. l. • J l. • l.J l. l. l. 
ri 
r. =a. + p(Z:: A./Z:: I R.w)K. 
l.C l. • J • • l:.J l. 
a. 
l. 
J l. J 
TR. = r. Z:: R1 . ]. l. • J 
J 
LRVC. = a. I R .. 
]. l. • l.J 
J 
K. = Z:: R . ./Z:: I: R .. 
l. i l.J • • l.J ]. J 
p I: A. 
j J 
E. 
]. 
wi 
J J 
Commercial and 
Farm Loans Industrial Loans 
-
.07528429 .07728364 
.05529 .0578237 
.05159532 .05218382 
$348,209,600 $549,819,870 
$238,642,090 $371,251,990 
.19 .29 
$472,253,450 $472,253,450 
3.18 3.08 
., $1,882,400 $'•, 850, 428 
Single Payment Loans 
.08065970 
.0460542 
.04489120 
$112,523,340 
$62,624,929 
.0574 
$472,253,450 
2.25 
$5,193,240 
....., 
IJ1 
Transfer Cost Equation: 
w. 
]_ 
E. 
]_ 
r. 
]_ 
t. ]_ 
r . = a . + p (L: A ./L: 2: R •• ) K. 
l.C l. • J • • l.J l. J l. J 
k = r. /r. 
l.C im 
ti 
TABLE VI 
TRANSFER COST 
2wi/Ei (1 - ki) 
Farm Loans 
$1,882,400 
3.18 
.07528429 
.05529 
.734417 
$4,553,508 
Commercial and 
Industrial Loans 
$4,850,428 
3.08 
.07728364 
.0578237 
.7482014 
$12,508,525 
Single Payment Loans 
$5,193,240 
2~25 
.08065970 
:0460542 
.5709691 
$10,759,629 
...... 
°' 
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the transfer cost for each loan. This transfer cost is given by t. in 
l. 
the last row of Table VI. 
The transfer cost is $4,553,508 for farm loans which is 1.3 percent 
of income on farm loans. For cormnercial and industrial loans the 
transfer cost is $12,508,525 or 2.2 percent of income on these loans. 
Single payment loans had a transfer cost of $10,759,629 which is 9.5 
percent of income on single payment loans. 
The total transfer cost is $27,821,662. Therefore, of total income 
from these three loans of $1,010,552,800, 2.7 percent was a monopoly 
transfer from borrowers to commercial banks. 
Cost of Regulation 
The total social cost of regulation is given by equation, '.12. This 
cost is simply the sum of the deadweight welfare loss on each loan plus 
the transfer cost for each loan. The total social cost is $39,747,730 
for the year 1975. This loss is 1.8 percent of total interest and fees 
on all loans and is 4.7 percent of the income earned on the three types 
of loans for which an interest elasticity was estimated. 
This chapter has presented the results of the model used in this 
study. The most serious problem, with unknown effects, is the use of 
stock rather than flow variables in the regression equations. If flow 
variables could have been obtained, not only might the poor results on 
several types of loans have been avoided, but the results on the other 
loans may have been better and certainly the results could be presented 
with more confidence in their accuracy. Even with this problem, a 
social cost was estimated which is relevant to 9·2.5 percent of the 
loans made in the Tenth District in 1975. 
CHAPTER VII 
CON~LUS IONS 
This study has been an attempt to look at some of the social costs 
associated with restricted entry into connnercial banking. The results 
were presented in Chapter VI. These results are interpreted below and 
their implications for public policy are discussed. In addition, 
possible avenues for further research on commercial banking and other 
.. 
sicuations of restricted entry are examined. 
Interpretation of the cost of regulation of commercial banking in 
the Tenth District is somewhat complex. Although this study did estimate 
a total social cost, there are two distinct components (i.e., deadweight 
welfare loss and transfer cost) which must be discussed separately since 
these two types of costs have different effects on society. 
The deadweight welfare loss which totals (11,926,068 (.56 percent 
of interest and fees on all loans) is relatively easy to interpret. 
This welfare loss represents the cost in the Tenth District of the 
misallocation of resources due to the monopoly interest rate exceeding 
the marginal cost of making particular loans. This loan is, of course, 
relevant only for 1975. The loss in other years could be higher or 
lower depending upon demand conditions for different types of loans. 
Even so it can be said that there was a deadweight welfare loss of 
$11,926,068 in 1975 in the Tenth District. 
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The transfer cost is not as easily interpreted. This transfer 
cost differs from the welfare loss in one important aspect. As 
discussed in Chapter II the transfer cost is represented by the 
additional revenue received from monopoly pricing over the life of the 
monopoly position. Therefore, the size of the transfer in a given year 
is not particularly important. What is important is the present value 
of the revenue flow. Firms (banks and potential banks) would be 
expected to use resources to obtain the flow of additional revenue up 
to the point that the incremental value of additional resources equaled 
the expected gain. Therefore, actual resource use in any given year 
would be determined by the present value of the expected flow of 
additional revenue (i.e., the transfer). Chapter II presented the 
three determinants of this expected flow; these were a valid discount 
rate, the normal risk that the firm may fail, and the time period over 
which the additional revenue flow would be received. The transfer cost 
estimated in this study is $27,821,662 for the single year 1975. It, 
therefore, is best interpreted as an indicator of the magnitude of the 
actual transfer cost. Clearly the potential size of the transfer cost 
is not small and may greatly exceed the deadweightwelfare loss. 
One of the primary reasons for restricted entry into connnercial 
banking was and is the feeling that vigorous competition in commercial 
banking leads periodically to excessive bank failure and therefore 
banking panics. Whether or not competition results in panics or 
whether or not restricted entry reduces the number of panics are not 
topics of this study. However, if society undertakes a particular policy 
it should have some knowledge of the results of that policy •. As shown 
in this study, the costs of restricted entry in commercial banking are 
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not insignificant. These costs for the nation as a whole, based on this 
study, could easily be several billions of dollars since the 1933 
Banking Act. The important consideration for public policy is the costs 
of having free entry, that is, what are the expected costs of bank 
failures and bank panics? If the expected costs of failures exceed the 
costs of regulation, then restricted entry can be justified. However, 
in fact, the arguments that banking failures and panics should be 
avoided are typically stated in terms of ":need" or the "public interest". 
There has not been an attempt to compare the costs of restricting entry 
to the costs of free entry. Although this paper is not a study of 
alternatives, the results do indicate that restricted entry has imposed 
su0stantial costs on society, while at the same time the benefits from 
this policy are at best rather vague. 
Even if there are no costs in terms of additional resource use as 
a result of the monopoly transfer, the size of the transfer is relevant. 
Restricted entry will alter the distribution of income from banking 
customers to bank owners. Since this redistribution is a result of 
public policy, it is certainly·important to know the size of the 
transfer. Society may or may.not wish to redistribute income in order 
to limit bank failures and panics, but without information concerning 
the transfer an informed decision cannot be made. 
This study indicates substantial costs resulting from restricted 
entry. Although the benefits from this policy are unknown, the benefits 
from eliminating restricted entry are, at least, not unknown. The costs 
indicated in this study could be eliminated at practically zero cost 
(ignoring costs of bank failures and panics). In fact, the costs of 
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eliminating restricted entry may be negative since some of the res0urces 
used to regulate the banking industry would be reallocated. 
Further Research 
The research conducted in this study could be improved upon in 
several ways. Since the data used consisted of information for the 
Tenth Federal Reserve District, it is not a valid sample for the entire 
United States. If a sample from all commercial banks in the United 
States were obtained, the results could then be applied to the entire 
commercial bank system. Another impro·vement would be an expansion of 
the study to include non-bank financial intermediaries, particularly 
those most heavily regulated such as savings and loan associations. It 
would also be useful to analyze the results of regulation on resource 
markets, particularly deposits. 
The most important improvement in the methodology would be the use 
of flow variables in the regressions. In principle the type of flow 
variables needed and their use is simple. For example, if monthly data 
on revenue and cost could be obtained, a better estimate of the average 
interest rates (i.e., the monopoly rates) and marginal costs could. be 
achieved by using the change in the different variables each month and 
using this change in the regression equations instead of the size of 
the outstanding loans and costs. While monthly data on cost might not 
be easy to incorporate into the model, this variation would greatly 
improve the revenue estimates. That is, more confidence could be placed 
on the estimated interest rates and the interest elasticities could be 
estimated without having to assume profit maximization. 
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The final major change concerns the transfer cost. Again, because 
this transfer is a revenue flow, the present value of this flow is 
important. If the model was applied for several years and if the 
results were correlated with the risk of failure and entry, a better 
estimate of the expected transfer, and therefore resource use, could 
be achieved. 
Clearly all of the potential costs of commercial bank regulation 
have.not been examined. A relatively minor cost would be the administra-
tive costs. This would include the costs of regulatory agencies and 
various administrative costs of banks due to record keeping and reporting 
which is related to regulation. Another area of regulatory costs is the 
possible inefficient use of capital. Even though the return on banking 
is not directly regulated, restricted entry combined with restricted· 
input and output prices may result in capital use beyond that which 
would occur under more competitive conditions. In addition, where a 
monopoly position exists X-inefficiency is more likely to be a problem. 
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